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Believing that grants-in-aid to state and local governments disarm the
opposition of local elites and are thus of dubious constitutionality, Profes-
sor Cover asserts that the federal government ought to do more itself.
However, his admonition that the federal government "ought to do more"
is very vague. Would Cover like to eliminate all grants-in-aid? If not,
what principles would guide his choice? Are direct federal orders to the
states with no accompanying subsidy funds really preferable to the regula-
tory strings attached to spending programs? When should federally
funded and administered programs preempt state and local initiatives and
when should they merely supplement them? I propose a way to think
about these unanswered questions and suggest that Cover's concerns are
misplaced. Ending "cooperative" federalism would be unlikely to increase
the political accountability of federal politicians significantly and could
have a number of detrimental effects.
I argue the following propositions. First, federal action can help prevent
states from benefiting at the expense of other states. Second, the federali-
zation of redistributive programs, while justifiable on other grounds,
would weaken, not strengthen, the states. Third, if Cover means to substi-
tute federal legal orders for grants, this change in intergovernmental rela-
tions could encourage irresponsible behavior by national politicians.
Fourth, to the extent intergovernmental grants would continue under
Cover's system, they would have to take the form of revenue sharing with
no restrictive conditions attached. Such transfers, if done on a large scale,
would encourage irresponsible behavior by state and local politicians. Fi-
nally, even restrictive grants may not constrain the choices of state and
local politicians very much. Federal money can substitute for state spend-
ing, thus freeing locally generated funds for other programs, and state
officials may even be able to use the presence of federal grants to generate
added public support for their own favorite projects. In practice, coopera-
tive programs might not buy off opposition, but instead support the objec-
tives of state political elites.




Cover sees states as political units that can, in certain circumstances,
challenge national power: State and nation ought to be politically combat-
ive. He forgets that, absent national controls, the combat may be among
the states. States may compete for business and population and seek to
impose external costs-such as air and water pollution or taxes-on resi-
dents of other states. We might call this "irresponsible federalism." Of
course, neighboring states can form interstate compacts to regulate their
relations, but these have not been notably successful.in the past. While
interstate port, bridge, and tunnel authorities have worked fairly well be-
cause states have reciprocal interests, compacts governing river use-for
example, in the Delaware or the Colorado-have worked less well be-
cause of inevitable conflicts of interest. Thus, federal legislation may be
needed to prevent the interstate imposition of external costs. The whole
point of such laws is to "co-opt" state political processes, doing so to pro-
tect the interest of citizens of other states. This could be done by direct
orders, by orders promulgated as a condition for grants, or. by taxes (lev-
ied, for example, on pollution transported across state lines). Thus, grants
are one way in which the federal government can "buy off" the state.
Silencing state opposition is the purpose of such grants, not an undesirable
side effect.'
II.
Many existing grant programs, however, have nothing to do with in-
ducing states to take interstate spillovers into account. Instead, they are
designed to redistribute income and services to the needy. It is a common-
place in the economic analysis of federalism to point out that state and
local governments are poor instruments of redistributive policy. To quote
the opinion in Helvering v. Davis: "[S]tates and local governments are at
times reluctant to increase so heavily the burden of taxation to be borne
by their residents for fear of placing themselves in a position of economic
disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors."' 2 Furthermore,
if a welfare or old age program exists in one state, it becomes "a bait to
the needy and dependent elsewhere encouraging them to migrate and seek
a haven of repose."' These concerns, combined with Cover's fears of co-
optation, argue in favor of federal preemption of redistributive functions.
1. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regula-
tion, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT (G. Eads & M. Fix, eds.)
(forthcoming).
2. 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937).
3. Id.
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The argument for preemption is further buttressed if one wishes a hori-
zontally equitable system. Medicaid, for example, although funded in part
by the federal government, gives the states considerable leeway to deter-
mine eligibility and covered services, and the result is wide variation in
the treatment of the poor across the country." In addition, administrative
efficiency argues in favor of a single system instead of dual state and fed-
eral programs with beneficiaries having to qualify separately for each set
of services. In fact, even if a dual system were established, states might
voluntarily use federal eligibility standards. They do this now in the tax
area, where many state income tax systems track the federal law quite
closely.5
Notice, however, that states purchase their freedom from federal inter-
vention at considerable cost. If the federal government begins to take full
responsibility for social welfare spending and preempts the states, the re-
sult is likely to be weaker and hence less combative state governments.
Such preemption would reduce the financial and political resources at the
disposal of state governments.
III.
Cover is not clear about what kinds of federal-state relations would de-
velop if grants were reduced. He does, however, mention the other "enu-
merated" powers, and the implication is that, under these powers, the fed-
eral government could order the states to behave in certain ways. The
substitution of legal orders for grants in certain areas would make state
politicians complain noisily, a result that Cover seems to equate with po-
litical responsibility. It would, however, surely make national politicians
less responsible. In fact, the recent federal programs that have caused the
most controversy and opposition at the state level are those with small
appropriations tied to large regulatory strings. The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 19756 and the 1978 amendments to the De-
velopmental Disabilities Act7 have both been criticized on this ground,
and a few jurisdictions have refused grants under these programs.' An
expansion of programs of this kind, not designed to correct specific inter-
4. J. HOLAHAN, FINANCING HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR 11-23 (1975).
5. See G. BREAK, FINANCING GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 37-39 (1980).
6. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401,
1411-1420, 1453 (1982)).
7. Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, 3003-17 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
6000-6081 (Supp. V. 1981)).
8. See Rose-Ackerman, Mental Retardation and Society: The Ethics and Politics of Normaliza-
tion, 93 ETHICS 81, 94-96 (1982); Roach, The Least Restrictive Environment Section of the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975: A Legislative History and an Analysis, 13 GONZAGA
L. REV. 717, 719 (1978).
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state externalities, would, I believe, be a mistake. Such legislation is rela-
tively easy for Congrss to pass because legislators can take credit for bold,
new initiatives without having to face up to the problem of finding tax
money to cover the costs of those programs. It would hardly seem much of
an improvement to make the regulatory orders mandatory and eliminate
the small grants. The national political process would be improved by
increasing, not decreasing, the accountability of political actors, even for
laws justified under some enumerated power other than the spending
power.
IV.
Cover would apparently favor a system in which intergovernmental
grants took the form of revenue sharing based on rigid demographic for-
mulas with no federal strings. Such grants would further Cover's goals by
increasing the resources available to states and localities without a corre-
sponding increase in federal control. State and local politicians could then
criticize the national government without inviting retaliation. Indeed, rev-
enue sharing programs are frequently resisted by national politicians,
since they reduce their control over federal tax monies, and are applauded
by governors and mayors because they provide a painless increase in re-
sources. However, although more extensive revenue-sharing might in-
crease the political power of state and local politicians, it would also in-
crease the potential for irresponsible spending decisions by these
politicians. Moreover, if states have unequal wealth, the most effective
federal policy is to redistribute income to citizens, not to give funds to
governmental units that may prove to be poor representatives of low-
income groups.9
V.
Finally, Cover's concerns about "cooperative federalism" seem mis-
placed. Even earmarked grants, nominally designed to overcome state op-
position to a federal program, may have little impact on state behavior. To
see this, consider what federal officials commonly call the "fungibility
problem." To illustrate this "problem," consider a lump-sum grant that
must be spent on a particular service. If the grant is less than a state's
pre-grant spending on that service, the state can treat the federal money as
9. Studies show that, despite formulas that take "need" into account, revenue sharing does not aid
low-income groups very much. See R. NATHAN, A. MANVEL & S. CALKINS, MONITORING REVENUE
SHARING 237-47 (1975); R. NATHAN & C. ADAMS, REVENUE SHARING: THE SECOND ROUND 67-75
(1977). The formulas are reported in Reischauer, General Revenue Sharing: The Program's Incen-
tives, in FINANCING THE NEW FEDERALISM 40, 41-56 (W. Oates ed. 1975).
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if it were an untied increase in resources. The state can simply shift its
own tax money into other programs. This "fungibility" problem is a se-
vere limit on the federal government's ability to control state behavior: It
tends to diffuse the effects of the federal money, thus blurring the differ-
ences between lump-sum grants and revenue-sharing grants.10
In addition, empirical work suggests that clever state and local politi-
cians can use federal money to further their own political goals, and not,
as Cover suggests, that federal money silences state and local opposition.
Considerable evidence supports the proposition that lump-sum grants
have "price" effects." In other words, state governments appear to behave
"as if" the grants lowered the marginal cost of services. This has been
called the "flypaper" effect: Money sticks where it hits. The idea behind
the effect is that governmental insiders (politicians, bureaucrats, and per-
haps organized interest groups that would benefit from increased spend-
ing) will manipulate the data so that voters perceive an illusory price ef-
fect and hence support higher levels of spending. Thus, instead of the
federal government co-opting state and local political elites, these groups
can use the federal grants to fool the populace into accepting more spend-
ing for elite-dominated programs.
10. Closed-ended matching grants-that is, grants in which the federal government agrees to
match state spending only up to a certain ceiling-share this difficulty. Indeed, once the ceiling is
exceeded, the grant operates just like a lump-sum grant.
11. See Gramlich, Intergovernmental Grants: A Review of the Empirical Literature, in THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 219 (W. Oates ed. 1977); S. Rose-Ackerman & R. Even-
son, Public Support for Agricultural Research and Extension: A Political-Economic Analysis (1983)
(unpublished manuscript on file with Yale Law Journal).
12. Courant, Gramlich & Rubinfeld, The Stimulative Effects of Intergovernmental Grants: Or
Why Money Sticks Where It Hits, in FISCAL FEDERALISM AND GRANTS-IN-AID 5 (P. Mieszkowski &
W. Oakland eds. 1979); Oates, Lump-Sum Intergovernmental Grants Have Price Effects, in id. at 23.
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